INTRODUCTION
Millions of divorced couples are regulated in their conduct as parents by the terms of parenting plans or custody and visitation orders established by the divorce courts. These judicial orders restrict certain parental choices, such as the amount of time that each parent will spend with the children and the manner in which important child-related decisions will be made. Prior to divorce, these same families were free of such detailed regulation by the state. In the eyes of the law, the post-divorce regulation of parenting activity serves the important purpose of protecting, in an orderly fashion, established relationships between children and both of their parents in light of the changed family circumstances that result from divorce.
Judicial orders allocating parental rights and responsibilities following divorce are mandatory in nature, requiring both parents to engage in certain types of conduct and to refrain from others. For example, a parent may be required to deliver the children to the physical custody of the other parent at specified times and in a specified manner. In another familiar example, one parent may be required to refrain from interfering in the children's medical care or education, if these areas of legal custody have been assigned to the other parent.
Although the terminology of "injunctive court orders" is not often used in the field of child custody law, the child-related orders of the divorce court are, indeed, injunctive in nature. They are typical of the judicial orders historically entered by the courts acting in equity, directing one party in a lawsuit to act in a specified way in order to vindicate the legal rights of the other party. Furthermore, in the event of noncompliance by the party directed to act, custody orders are enforceable by the remedies generally associated with "equitable," "injunctive," or "coercive" court orders. Most notably, a parent who fails to comply with the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan is subject to the remedies of civil and criminal contempt, which may result in the imposition of a fine or jail sentence by the court.
This Article evaluates the nature of custody and visitation orders as coercive court orders, and their enforcement via civil and criminal contempt remedies. Studied against the backdrop of the law of injunctions, certain aspects of custody law illustrate nicely the general features of injunctive remedies doctrine. For example, the substantive and procedural confusion involved in distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt, which plagues the enforcement of injunctive orders in other fields such as torts and contracts, routinely complicates the enforcement of court-ordered parenting plans. Other 2007] ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS 837 examples of commonality involve the operation of both private interests and public interests (the vindication of judicial authority), and the scope of judicial discretion.
Other dominant features of custody orders and their enforcement, however, are not consistent with the general definition and operation of injunctive remedies. First, injunctive or coercive court orders typically operate as a remedy for past unlawful activity. In a familiar example, the party to a contract may be ordered to specifically perform contract duties, only after the court determines that a past breach of the contract has occurred. By way of contrast, in the divorce context, the court enters coercive parenting orders absent any determination that either parent has engaged in past unlawful conduct. Both the order of specific performance in the contract case and the custody order in the divorce case become enforceable by contempt, in the event of subsequent noncompliance.
A second aspect of custody orders also sets them apart from the general model of the injunctive or coercive court order. Namely, in many other fields, the courts have discretion in deciding whether to impose injunctive relief or another form of relief (often monetary damages). Several factors influence the selection of remedy; for example, injunctions are less likely to be entered if the court anticipates a long or difficult period of judicial supervision over the party enjoined. By way of contrast, the divorce courts are required, with rare exception, to enter custody orders designed to regulate the conduct of parents over a period of years, even in cases where parental conflict in the past suggests that compliance problems may arise in the future.
Like the routine entry of coercive custody orders absent prior wrongdoing, this additional variation from the dominant model of the injunction reflects the compelling nature of the family interests regulated in the post-divorce custody and visitation context. Part I of this Article explores the nature of custody and visitation orders as coercive judicial orders mandating specified post-divorce conduct by parents. The discussion explores the history of custody jurisdiction in the equity courts prior to the merger of law and equity, and the continuing characterization of custody law as a field where the courts exert direct authority over individuals. This Part also discusses the aspects of custody orders that are distinct from other injunctive or coercive orders, and the significance of these differences.
Part II focuses on the enforcement of court-ordered parenting plans, especially via the remedies of civil and criminal contempt. A close analysis of selected custody contempt cases reveals the ways in which classic contempt remedies have been applied and sometimes reshaped to fit the special 838 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:835 1. See SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS ch. 5 (1992) (describing parental responsibility for the financial support, education, and medical care of children); id. ch. 6 (describing parental authority to discipline children); id. ch. 9[I] (describing tort doctrines that protect the parent-child relationship).
2. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (discussing constitutional protection for parental rights in the context of grandparent visitation); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.4, at 612 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing protection for parents under the Due Process Clause in settings where the state seeks to involuntarily terminate parental rights).
3. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(1)(C) (Supp. 2004 ) ("The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage . . enforcement requirements in this field. The flexible formulation of contempt sanctions in these enforcement cases, like the ready availability of coercive orders at the time of divorce, involves significant adjustments to traditional remedies doctrines. The law of injunctions and contempt remedies are key features of custody and visitation law. As described in this Article, traditional doctrines governing the entry and enforcement of coercive judicial orders have been adjusted in significant ways in order to address the public and private interests involved in the post-divorce family.
PART I: THE NATURE OF PARENTING PLAN ORDERS

A. Custody Orders Protect Parent-Child Relationships
In the eyes of the law, the relationships established between parents and their minor children are a key element in the maintenance of successful families and communities, entitled to legal recognition and protection. Various legal doctrines reflect the view that children's interests are wellserved by the maintenance of strong ties to the parents who provide support and guidance to them. Furthermore, the parent's interest in this important 1 relationship has been characterized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right in the constitutional sense. established family relationships. In the context of divorce, where children have resided with both of their parents in the past, a strong presumption exists that the court's orders will recognize and protect the children's future relationships with both parents. Thus, "[c]ourts have recognized authorities that say the child has a right to know, love, and respect both parents and to receive guidance and love from both. . . . If both parents are fit, usually a child's best interests are served through continuing contact with both parents." This result in the post-divorce family also protects the relational 4 interests of parents vis-à-vis their children.
5
The terms of a post-divorce custody arrangement or parenting plan may be set by the parents themselves, subject to court approval. Many divorcing 6 couples take advantage of this settlement option. Absent such an agreement 7 between the parents, the divorce court sets the terms, by reference to general standards established by state law. In either case, the court ultimately issues 8 orders describing a parenting plan designed to serve the interests of the children following their parents' divorce.
B. The Residential and Decisionmaking Provisions of Custody Orders
Court-ordered parenting plans must address two key issues. First, the physical or residential custody part of the order must state where the children REV. 347, 351-56 (2005) .
13. Critics point out that the traditional terms "custody" and "visitation" tend to limit the ways in which post-divorce parenting can be conceptualized. The drafters of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution expressed this concern and proposed alternative terminology, as follows:
These traditional terms represent, and help to perpetuate, an adversarial, win-lose paradigm of divorce. . . . [The ALI] uses "custodial responsibility" to encompass all forms of custody and visitation. The more inclusive terminology expresses the ordinary expectation that both parents have meaningful responsibilities for their child at divorce; it leaves open the question of what those responsibilities will be. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 7. Another alternative to the traditional terminology of "custody" and "visitation" employs the general label "parenting plan" to cover the court-defined rights and duties of parents. The legislatures in certain states have rewritten their statutes in response to criticism of the traditional terminology in this field. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(a) (Supp. 2005) . The majority of state statutes continue to use the terms "custody" and "visitation." will reside, and the periods of time they will spend with each parent. And 9 second, the legal custody or decision making part of the order must detail the authority of one or both parents over important areas of future decision making, such as medical care and education, for the children.
10
Decision making authority as to particular topics affecting children in the future can be assigned to one parent or to both simultaneously. The term "joint legal custody" typically contemplates shared decision making authority by the parents regarding some or all areas of future care for the children.
11
While divorced parents can share authority in this manner for future decisions regarding the children, they generally cannot share the same periods of physical custody. Various models exist for the allocation of physical custody, and a divorce decree typically spells out the time to be spent by the 12 children with each parent. In cases where one parent is assigned the responsibility of serving as the primary residential custodian, so-called "visitation orders" of the court establish the times of access for the other parent.
13
The West Virginia statutes governing post-divorce parenting arrangements reflect the features described above: the ability of parents to formulate their own plan, the need to address both residential and decision making issues for the children, and the court's role in protecting the interests of the children. Thus, a provision titled "Allocation of significant decisionmaking responsibility" states that " [u] § 48-9-206(a) . Notably, the West Virginia legislation sets out two different standards to govern judicial decision making about the dual aspects of custody. Thus, the provision regarding legal custody establishes the best interests of the child standard, which is the standard most frequently employed in custody cases nationwide. Under this standard, the court has wide discretion in deciding which facts and circumstances in each case are most important in formulating a custody order. By way of contrast, the approximation standard established in the West Virginia residential custody provision leaves less discretion to the judge, because information about the role of each parent as caregiver prior to divorce must be given the greatest weight. This enactment follows the model proposed in the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, and does not represent the majority rule in the United States. Many state custody laws employ a less directive standard, often requiring the judge to allocate physical as well as legal custody according to the discretionary best interests of the child standard. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 5, § 11.03 [A] . of the parents . . . , the court shall allocate responsibility for making significant life decisions on behalf of the child, including the child's education and health care, to one parent or to two parents jointly, in accordance with the child's best interest . . . ."
An additional provision addresses the 14 "
[a]llocation of custodial responsibility" as follows: "Unless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . or unless manifestly harmful to the child, the court shall allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents' separation . . . ."
15
C. The Coercive Nature of Custody Orders
Court orders relating to the residential and decision making aspects of post-divorce parenting are coercive in nature, designed to govern the conduct of family members for the period of years between the parents' divorce and the children's ages of majority. Residential and legal custody orders require the parents to act or not act in certain ways.
The residential terms of a typical custody order describe when the children will spend time with each parent, and how the periodic transfer of physical custody will be accomplished. Each parent has affirmative duties, then, to release the children into the care of the other at the times and in the manner described in the custody order.
For example, if the parenting plan provides that children will reside with their mother during the week and their father on weekends, the mother would be in noncompliance if, without obtaining a prior modification of the plan, she took the children on vacation for a full week and failed to return them to the father for the weekend. Conversely, the father's conduct would be unlawful 842 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:835 16. See, e.g., Funk v. Macaulay, 457 N.E.2d 223, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983 ) (upholding trial court contempt judgment based on a general finding that "the defendant . . . is interfering with and interrupting the care, custody, and guidance of the plaintiff with respect to the minor children [,] " and the more specific finding "that the defendant has counseled and encouraged [the] minor child of the parties not to attend school and that such conduct has interfered and prevented the plaintiff from requiring said minor child to attend school").
17 REV. 115 (1994) .
18. The parent who spends less residential time with the children is more likely to find himself or herself subject to restrictions of this nature. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 5, § 11.05 [B] (discussing "restrictions on visitation").
19. Ryder v. Ryder, No. 2001CA00190, 2002 WL 258218 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002 .
if he failed to return the children to the care of their mother at the end of a weekend period. Each of these scenarios involves a failure by the noncompliant parent to take affirmative actions required by the initial custody order.
The legal or decision making aspects of a parenting plan similarly create mandates regarding post-divorce parenting conduct. Often these orders require one parent to refrain from taking certain actions with respect to the children. When sole legal custody is assigned by the court to one parent, an enforceable obligation is imposed upon the other not to interfere with the custodian's authority.
For example, if the parent with sole authority 16 regarding medical care decides against a child's elective tonsillectomy, the other parent is obligated to abide by this decision, even if he or she believes that the procedure would be beneficial. If the noncustodial parent takes the child to a hospital for the surgery during a period of scheduled visitation, he or she would be in noncompliance with the custody order. Divorce decrees may seek to govern additional aspects of post-divorce parenting, beyond the major aspects of residential and decision making custody. Additional regulations may be included because they appear in a parenting plan agreement, or because the divorce court believes that they would serve the children's interests. unnecessary court involvement, and each shall make an effort to be flexible when able for the sake, benefit and best interests of the minor child . . . .
20
All of these custody provisions are enforceable by the court. If one parent believes that the other parent has violated the residential, decision making or other provisions of their post-divorce parenting plan, he or she may initiate an enforcement proceeding. The court then will hold a hearing to determine whether the other parent in fact violated the earlier court orders and, if so, the appropriate remedy. In the Ryder case, for example, the mother was held in contempt of court for violating the custody order requiring the parents to "communicate with each other."
21
The regulation of post-divorce parenting conduct in this fashion can be experienced by parents as a serious interference with their autonomy. This intrusion by the state, in the form of enforceable judicial mandates about future conduct, is intended to accomplish the goal of supporting the relationships between children and both of their parents following divorce.
D. Custody Law in Historical Context
The historical background of child custody law sheds light on the coercive nature of parenting plan and child custody and visitation orders in the modern family law context. The law of child custody is a survivor of the equity system of jurisprudence, which first arose in the Chancellor's court in England and developed over the centuries alongside the courts of law in England and the United States. Professor Homer Clark traced the power of 22 courts in equity to act for the welfare of children back to the seventeenth century, and attributed the equitable character of such actions "to the range and flexibility of remedy available in equity." Generally speaking, in the era described by Professor Clark, the courts of law adjudicated specific rights and liabilities of litigating parties, and their orders were enforceable in a subsequent action by the prevailing party against the money or property of the other. By way of contrast, judgments made by 24 courts in equity about the litigants' respective rights typically resulted in an order requiring the losing party to perform a specified act. The judicial enforcement of such equitable orders focused on the person of the defendant, rather than his or her property. A key enforcement device in equity was the 25 contempt power of the court directed against the individual who defied the court's initial order, for which the sanctions of a monetary fine and imprisonment could be imposed. Professor Dan Dobbs highlighted the crucial differences between the two systems of justice, as follows:
In the old separate court system, law courts adjudicated rights and liabilities but they issued no commands. Instead they preferred to enforce judgments in rem. The old separate equity courts worked the other way around. Their decrees ended in a personal command telling the defendant to do something or to cease doing something. . . . This difference wrought a difference in enforcement. The old separate equity court often enforced its decree by using contempt powers, fining or imprisoning the defendant until he complied with the decree. This is sometimes called in personam enforcement, in contrast to the in rem enforcement at law.
26
Within this historical framework, court orders regarding the future parenting of children constituted the quintessential "equitable order." A custody or visitation order was a "personal directive" in the sense described by Professor Dobbs, requiring parents to act (or not act) in certain ways with regard to matters affecting their children.
In the evolution of the legal systems in England and the United States, the separate courts of law and equity ultimately merged into a single unified judicial system. In spite of this structural unification, judges and analysts of 27 the law continue to this day to distinguish between judicial orders that 2007] ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS 845
28. Id. § 1.4, at 13 (emphasis added) (using a custody hypothetical to illustrate the point).
See generally JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 2[d]
, at 5 (1999) ("Injunctions are a form of equitable relief whereby a defendant is ordered to do something (mandatory injunction) or refrain from doing something (prohibitory or negative injunction). A defendant who violates the terms of an injunction may be sanctioned by being held in contempt of court.").
30. See DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.5(1). But see id. § 1.1, at 6 (describing modern trend toward diluting the "irreparable harm rule").
31. The rule restricts injunctive relief to situations where legal remedies would be inadequate to compensate the injured party. See FISCHER, supra note 29, § 21[a], at 148-49.
32. See id. § 24, at 168-69 (noting that "equitable injunctive relief has been refused when the required performance would be unreasonably difficult to enforce or require lengthy judicial supervision"); adjudicate rights with an eye toward satisfaction in the form of money, and orders that mandate personal behavior. One meaningful consequence flowing from this continuing distinction involves the different remedies available to enforce each type of court order. Remedial orders of the court directed against the noncompliant party, such as contempt, remain the hallmark of enforcement as to orders that would have been characterized in the past as equitable. Professor Dobbs has summarized these aspects of the modern legal system following merger of the separate systems of law and equity, as follows:
Most judicial systems have long since combined law and equity courts in a single court having the powers of both the old law and the old equity courts. So it is technically no longer right . . . to say that equity enforces decrees in personam while law enforces them in rem. However, the kind of decree equity once issued, a coercive, in personam order directing the defendant to act in a specified way, is enforceable by contempt just as it was when there were separate equity courts. It is still common, by way of shorthand, to associate contempt powers with "equity," although it is more accurate to associate them with a valid coercive order.
28
Within this modern frame of reference, custody and visitation orders are readily characterized as "coercive" orders. Although divorce court orders regarding the future parenting of children are not generally referred to as "injunctions," they fall squarely into the general definition of injunctive court orders that are enforceable, inter alia, by contempt.
29
The historical assignment of custody cases to the courts of equity supports the routine entry of coercive custody orders in the modern context. In formulating remedies in individual cases, modern courts sometimes apply a doctrine called the "irreparable harm rule," which creates a preference for 30 legal remedies, typically money damages, and restricts the availability of injunctive relief. An important consideration under this choice-of-remedies 31 doctrine is the predictability of compliance with and need for extensive judicial supervision over an injunctive order. Notably, the limitation on 35. Institutional reform cases provide another setting where coercive judicial orders often involve the courts with the parties and the subject matter of the decree for an extended period of time. The "structural injunction" is a remedy utilized in cases where a public institution has conducted its business in an unconstitutional manner, such as a school district that has failed to comply with desegregation requirements. See FISCHER, supra note 29, § 46(c); OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 92-94 (1978) . The injunction typically requires reorganization of the public institution to bring its operation into constitutional compliance, a process that may take many years to complete. See James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815 REV. , 1816 REV. (1984 (describing "the formal powers that are available to the federal courts" in cases where institutional defendants assert an inability to comply with structural injunctions due to lack of coercive or injunctive orders under the irreparable harm rule does not apply to "those matters that had historically and traditionally been heard in equity," 33 a category that includes child custody cases.
Indeed, no traditionally "legal" or "in rem" order of the court, such as an order to pay money, could address the goal of protecting post-divorce parentchild relationships. Coercive orders, designed to regulate the future conduct of both parents and enforceable by the remedy of contempt, are the norm in child custody cases. Considerations involving the difficulty of future enforcement, which influence the decision whether to enter coercive orders under the irreparable harm doctrine, have no application in this context.
34
Neither demonstrated animosities within the family, which may suggest compliance problems in the future, nor the ages of the children, which indicate the likely duration of the court's order, acts as a deterrent. Coercive orders that endure until children reach adulthood are the norm. The door, then, is opened at the time of divorce to the possibility of ongoing judicial involvement for extended periods of time, even in difficult cases. The doctrines relating to enforcement and remedies, discussed in Part II, take on added significance in these circumstances. 
E. Custody Orders Are Not Premised on a Determination of Wrongdoing
An element of necessity characterizes the entry of coercive judicial orders regarding the custody of children at the time of divorce. State custody laws reflect the view that such orders are necessary to protect existing parent-child relationships, in a clear and certain manner, in light of the family's changed circumstances. This context for creating coercive judicial orders differs in 36 one significant aspect from the entry of coercive or injunctive orders in other litigation settings. Namely, in many other types of cases, such as tort and contract cases, the coercive or injunctive order functions as a remedy for one party based on a judicial determination of wrongdoing by the other. No such determination of wrongdoing by one party takes place when the court initially establishes the coercive terms of a post-divorce parenting plan.
A description of typical injunctive orders in the fields of torts and contracts serves to illustrate the difference. In a tort case where the plaintiff complains that a structure built by the defendant unlawfully encroaches on the plaintiff's land, the court must first determine whether a trespass has in fact occurred. If so, the available remedies include damages or a coercive, injunctive order requiring the defendant to remove the encroaching structure. In the event that injunctive relief is granted, and the defendant subsequently fails to comply, the plaintiff then may bring an action for contempt against the defendant. Another familiar example arises in the context of contract 37 enforcement. Here, the court may order the defendant to perform obligations arising under a private contract, based on a threshold determination of the defendant's past unlawful failure to perform them. If the defendant subsequently fails to comply with the order of specific performance, the plaintiff may initiate an enforcement proceeding in which the defendant may be held in contempt of court.
38
By way of contrast, entry of the initial custody order in a divorce proceeding involves no determination of wrongdoing by either parent. The custody orders of the divorce court are coercive, injunctive orders, like the injunction in a trespass case or the order to specifically perform contractual obligations in a breach of contract case. Furthermore, the failure by one parent to comply with the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan entitles the other parent to seek the same type of judicial enforcement, including contempt remedies, available in the tort and contract examples. The distinction highlighted here is the absence of any unlawful conduct by one party, such as the commission of a tort or breach of a contract, underlying the entry of the initial custody order.
39
Professor Clark addressed this aspect of initial custody and visitation orders, involving the absence of any claim or finding of wrongdoing, when he observed that "[i]n its practical consequences [the custody proceeding in equity] is much like a declaratory judgment suit . . . ." That is, the function 40 of the custody order is to articulate the respective rights and responsibilities of the parents under a post-divorce parenting plan. This characterization as a "declaratory judgment," however, fails to capture the coercive aspect of the typical custody order. As a general rule, the declaratory judgment "does not compel an immediate, specific obligation to do something. Such judgments lack an 'operative command. '" 41 While the court-ordered parenting plan could be viewed as a mere declaration of the respective rights and responsibilities of the parents regarding the future residence of and decision making for their minor children, divorce courts typically intend to do more. That is, they intend to set the family plan in motion by mandating certain conduct of the parties.
Indeed, the custody statutes in several states require divorce courts to clearly state that the terms of their orders are mandatory. For example, the Rhode Island statute provides that " [t] Therefore, the mother's failure to make reasonable efforts to support the scheduled trip constituted a violation of the custody order, and she was held in contempt of court.
The Indiana legislature has defined the effect of visitation orders in a more restrictive manner. The Indiana visitation enforcement statute provides that a parent whose court-ordered visitation rights have been violated is entitled to a temporary restraining order or injunction, requiring the custodial parent to obey the initial visitation order in the future. An action for 47 contempt and other equitable enforcement remedies only become available in a second enforcement proceeding, upon proof of the custodial parent's subsequent violation of this injunction. In this manner, the Indiana statute 48 fails to treat the initial visitation order itself as an injunctive or coercive order. Indeed, the two-step enforcement procedure, requiring the initial entry of an injunction based on past wrongdoing, is parallel to the use of injunctive relief in the tort and contract scenarios described above. JUDGES' J., Spring 1994 , at 2, 6 (discussing the incidence of parental concern about child safety in visitation enforcement cases).
The mother in Morgan was jailed under a contempt order in the District of Columbia after hiding her child from the father whom she considered abusive. Her refusal to comply with the contempt order by revealing her child's location resulted in a lengthy period of incarceration, which ended when Congress enacted a time limit on imprisonments for civil contempt in child custody cases in the District of Columbia. See David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4 BYU J. PUB. equitable remedies for the violation of an injunctive court order, including contempt. The establishment of coercive orders in this manner, in the absence of any finding of wrongdoing by one party, is a special feature of the child custody context. State custody laws require this form of regulation, based on an assumption that established family relationships require protective state action at the time of parental divorce.
PART II: ENFORCEMENT Part I analyzed the nature of custody orders as coercive court orders. Part II will explore the issue of enforcement, in particular, the judicial implementation of contempt remedies for the violation of custody orders. As described in Part I, the priority assigned by the family law system to post-divorce parent-child relationships results in the routine entry of coercive court orders. As revealed in this Part, the same protective concern for parent-child relationships also shapes the enforcement doctrines in this field.
A. Noncompliance With Custody Orders
Judicial orders creating post-divorce parenting plans are generally designed to regulate the conduct of family members for an extended period of time, until the children reach adulthood. A parent may be dissatisfied with custody and visitation orders at the time of divorce, or dissatisfaction may develop over time. State custody laws provide that either parent may seek judicial modification in certain circumstances. Absent such judicial action, 49 however, the parents remain obligated to perform the duties imposed upon them at the time of divorce.
In some cases, divorced parents fail to comply over time with the terms of their court-ordered parenting plans. The noncompliant parent may be motivated by concern for the children's well-being, as in the hypothetical 53. The second piece of quantitative information required to understand the incidence of custody enforcement issues is the number of divorces involving the parents of minor children. The rate of divorce in families with children is high. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 626 (1978) ("Of the nearly one million divorces each year, an estimated 62% involve children."). See generally GUGGENHEIM, supra note 6, at 134 ("Today, more than 1 million marriages end in divorce each year.").
54. Koel et al., supra note 52, at 270. There was likely an additional number of families where one parent believed that the other had not complied with the terms of post-divorce custody and visitation orders, was not satisfied with the status quo, but did not bring the matter to the attention of the court. See Ira Daniel Turkat, Child Visitation Interference in Divorce, 14 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 737, 742 (1994) case discussed earlier where the noncustodial parent subjected a child to unauthorized elective surgery. Other reasons for noncompliance may include the belief that a custody order is unfair, the desire to inflict harm on a former spouse, or the inability of parents to overcome practical hurdles or to communicate with each other. In the event of noncompliance by one parent, the other has standing to initiate an enforcement proceeding. 51 An important empirical study of post-divorce litigation, published in 1994, revealed that a significant number of divorced parents returned to court in this manner alleging noncompliance with custody and visitation orders.
52
The study involved 700 couples with children who obtained divorces in the family court in Cambridge, Massachusetts between 1978 and 1984. The researchers studied the court records for all of these families through 1988, thus tracking their litigation histories for periods ranging from four to ten years.
The Cambridge study reported on the incidence of post-divorce litigation regarding custody, visitation, support and property issues. The researchers' 53 overall conclusion was that "[t]he amount of relitigation was remarkable; 41% (287) Post-Divorce Family Life, 1986 J. DIVORCE 1, 5 (reporting, in a study of forty-three post-divorce families, that "none of the joint families had relitigated, whereas 56% of the single custody parents had returned to court at least once to battle over money and visitation") (emphasis added)).
Other studies distinguish between custody issues and financial issues, but do not break down the custody category into modification and enforcement subcategories. 
B. The Public and Private Interests at Stake
The enforcement of custody or visitation orders, in a proceeding initiated by one parent alleging noncompliance by the other, protects important public and private interests. First, as a general rule in civil litigation, the enforcement of court orders reinforces the credibility of the courts and a general attitude of public deference to judicial authority. Thus, "[t]he judicial system arguably could not survive as an effective institution unless it could punish disobedience of orders or disruption of its proceedings . . . ." disobedience of court orders, including custody orders, is referred to as "indirect" contempt of the court, and the form of contempt that involves misbehavior in the courtroom is labeled "direct" contempt. reference, the entry of remedial orders in custody and visitation enforcement proceedings serves to strengthen the judicial system. Beyond this public interest in maintaining respect for the institution of the courts, the enforcement of custody and visitation orders vindicates private interests as well. Both the complaining parent and the children are directly 60 affected by the other parent's noncompliance with a court-ordered parenting plan. From the children's perspective, the initial parenting plan orders were deemed by the court at the time of their entry to serve the children's interests. Therefore, a significant variation by one parent from the terms of the plan, to which the other parent objects, is assumed to be contrary to the children's interests. In addition, one parent's noncompliance with the terms of a 61 parenting plan clearly interferes with the established rights of the other. The complaining parent initiates a custody or visitation enforcement proceeding in order to vindicate these private family interests.
If the court determines that one parent has violated the terms of a courtordered parenting plan, the court must then select and impose appropriate remedies and sanctions. The general purpose of such remedial action is vindication of the public and private interests described in this Section.
C. Remedies
Upon finding that one parent has violated the terms of a parenting plan, the court must establish remedial goals, and impose sanctions designed to achieve them. Most enforcement cases involve the noncompliance by one parent with residential parenting orders, and the most frequently stated goal is to bring the violator into compliance in the future. The court may, however, articulate additional goals in this context, most notably, the punishment of a parent for past violations or compensation of the complaining parent for his or her resulting losses. Various remedies, including civil and criminal contempt, are tailored to achieve each of these goals. Under the laws of most states, the range of judicial remedies for the violation of custody and visitation orders is wide. First, contempt remedies become available whenever parental noncompliance is viewed as the violation of a coercive or injunctive order of the court. Under general contempt doctrines in every state, the courts are empowered to directly enforce their injunctive orders. Typical sanctions under these general contempt doctrines 63 are a fine and imprisonment, in amounts and for time periods that may be limited by state law. In the family law area, statutes in more than half of the states detail the availability of contempt remedies in custody and visitation enforcement cases. Besides contempt, the habeas corpus doctrine has traditionally provided a remedy for the violation of custody and visitation orders in certain circumstances. The parent entitled to custody has standing to initiate a 65 proceeding, wherein the other parent must produce the child in court. Professor Arnold Rutkin has noted the limitations of this remedy for many common custody enforcement fact patterns:
Habeas corpus will not be an effective remedy in all situations. When the period of wrongful detainment is very short, the issue may become moot before the writ can be processed. Additionally, a writ of habeas corpus will not alone deter future interference with custody or visitation rights.
66
Another potential remedy for the violation of parenting plan orders involves the modification of certain terms of the parents' divorce decree. The terms subject to possible modification are the alimony and child support provisions, or even the violated custody and visitation orders. These 67 68 modification sanctions, however, are controversial and are not uniformly accepted by state legislatures and courts as remedies for noncompliance with custody and visitation orders.
69
The courts in many states have the authority to require noncompliant parents to post a bond, which is forfeitable to the court in the event of any future violation of the initial custody order. The primary goal here is to 70 coerce compliance by tying a defined financial sanction to subsequent noncompliance.
In § 14-10-129.5 (2004) . 73. Id. § 14-10-129.5(2)(h). Besides the enforcement tools available in the family court, some jurisdictions establish tort and criminal causes of action relating to the interference with parental rights. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:17 (discussing tort doctrines); 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11 [3] (discussing criminal law). For example, the Colorado "parenting time dispute" statute discussed in the text provides that "[n]othing in this section shall preclude a party's right to a separate and independent legal action in tort." COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(4). 78. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.11 (describing circumstances in which the court may modify a custody order by terminating the custodial responsibility of a parent).
79. Custody enforcement schemes that include the contempt remedy in this manner as an alternative to specified noncontempt remedies follow a pattern described by Professor Dobbs as to the general enforcement of coercive court orders: in carrying out the responsibility of custody enforcement. For example, the 71 Colorado statute governing " [d] isputes concerning parenting time" contains 72 versions of the contempt, modification and security remedies described above. In addition, the statute provides for court-mandated mediation, parental education, family counseling, makeup parenting time, civil fines payable to the state treasurer, the payment of attorney fees, court costs and expenses to the petitioning parent, and "[a]ny other order that may promote the best interests of the child." Additional remedies appearing in the corresponding 73 provisions of other state family codes include "other economic sanctions which may be decided on a case-by-case basis," suspension of the 74 noncompliant parent's driver's license, community service, and a warrant 75 76 or writ issued by the court to involve law enforcement personnel in the custody enforcement effort.
77
Notably, the list of remedies does not routinely include the denial of future custody rights to the parent who violated custody orders in the past. The state interest in protecting children's relationships with their parents, reflected in the initial coercive order of the divorce court, also supports their maintenance over time except in extreme cases.
78
The place of the traditional contempt remedy within the elaborate array of remedial options in the custody enforcement field varies from state to state. One model, illustrated by the Colorado statute summarized above, includes contempt as an alternative to specified noncontempt remedies, including the ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS 857
[E]quitable decrees are traditionally in personam, that is, personal orders to the defendant to act in a particular way. . . . Because they are personal orders, they are often enforced coercively, through the contempt power. They may also be enforced in other, less drastic ways, however. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.8(1), at 130. See generally Livingston, supra note 58, at 421 ("Of course, not every order lends itself to noncontempt enforcement mechanisms . . . . In some cases, the defendants' personal performance will be required to ensure that the proper result is attained. If the defendants simply refuse to comply and other enforcement mechanisms are not practicable, contempt sanctions may be the only route for achieving enforcement of the order.").
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(2)(e) (2004) . This statute provides no guidance to the courts about the appropriate amount of a fine, or length of a jail sentence. Family court contempt provisions in other jurisdictions fill these numerical gaps. For example, the South Dakota statute limits fines to $1000, and jail sentences to three days. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-5 (1999).
81. A final approach to the codification of contempt doctrine for the purpose of child custody and visitation enforcement involves legislative silence. The family codes in some jurisdictions make no reference to contempt remedies, leaving the custody courts to determine the proper application of the state's general contempt law in custody cases.
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.644(2) (West 2002). 83. Id. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(7) (1998) ("If the court finds that a parent has violated a part of the order, the court may find that parent in contempt and may . . . [o] rder that additional visitation be provided for a parent to take the place of visitation that was wrongfully denied; or . . . posting of a bond, modification of the divorce decree, family education programs, and mediation. Thus, the list of remedies under this statute also includes "[a]n order finding the parent who did not comply with the parenting time schedule in contempt of court and imposing a fine or jail sentence. , at 47-69 n.10 (collecting and summarizing cases involving the issue of willful noncompliance). Numerous cases involving the willfulness of parental noncompliance with custody and visitation orders involve older children who were, according to the allegedly noncompliant parent, unwilling to spend time sanctions for contempt in child custody enforcement cases far exceeds the traditional contempt sanctions of fines and imprisonment.
In most reported custody and visitation enforcement cases, the complaining parents sought sanctions associated with the remedy of contempt under state law. The selection of remedy and imposition of sanctions by the court in each case depended on the circumstances of the family, the nature of the parenting plan violations, and the remedial goals set by the court. As described in the remainder of this Article, contempt remedies in the field of child custody have been used by the courts in a flexible manner to achieve the important goals associated with the enforcement of court-ordered parenting plans.
D. Judicial Discretion in Contempt Cases
Trial courts exercise discretion as to all aspects of a custody contempt proceeding, and the general standard of review on appeal is the abuse of discretion standard. This aspect of custody enforcement doctrine involves 84 the application of general rules governing judicial contempt proceedings to the family law setting.
In custody enforcement proceedings, the court must first determine whether the allegedly noncompliant parent willfully violated the terms of established parenting plan orders. As to this threshold determination, recurring issues on appeal involve the clarity of the custody terms and the willfulness of the contemnor's failure to comply with them. For example, the "clarity" issue provided the basis for reversal of a mother's conviction for contempt in the case of Kranis v. Kranis. There, the appellate court ruled 85 that a term in the custody decree providing for "reasonable visitation" was not "clear and definite," and the trial court's contrary conclusion on this key issue constituted an abuse of discretion.
86
A second appealable element in the threshold determination of unlawful conduct involves the willfulness of the parent's violation of the court-ordered parenting plan. In the case of In re Marriage of S.G. and V.G [w] hether . . . a party is guilty of contempt rests within the sole discretion of the trial court," in affirming a finding that mother's failure to make children available for visitation with father was not willful); Midyett v. Midyett, 744 So. 2d 669, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T] he facts leading up to the lost visitation . . . do not rise to the level of willful, contemptuous behavior warranting reversal of the trial court's abundant discretion.") (emphasis added).
90. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:7, at 15-23 ("The court has discretion and some flexibility in fashioning the appropriate remedy for civil contempt.").
91. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 25-4A-5 (1999) (imposing limits on the amount of fines and length of jail sentences for "violation of the custody or visitation provisions of a court decree").
92. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52. Wolk, 828 P.2d 634, 636 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992 ) (construing the word "shall" in the state custody contempt statute to remove judicial discretion example, the trial court found that a mother had good cause for withholding scheduled visitation, due to her child's illness. On appeal, the S.G. court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that noncompliance with the custody order in these circumstances had not been willful, and that the mother was By way of contrast, the trial court's decision about appropriate sanctions for contempt received less deference from the appellate court in the case of Nelson v. Nelson. There, the initial custody order required the mother "to 97 bring the children to . . . scheduled visitation dates." The trial court found 98 the mother in contempt for failing to comply with the visitation schedule on two occasions, and imposed as sanctions a fine and an award of attorney fees to the father. On appeal, the Nelson court affirmed the trial court's contempt determination based on the missed visitation, but reversed the decision regarding sanctions. According to the appellate court, "a monetary fine is simply too harsh a punishment under the circumstances . . . ; a warning to respondent concerning the consequences of future transgressions of this nature is sufficient."
99
The appellate court in Nelson also reversed the trial court's entry of two additional contempt citations against the mother, relating to other provisions of the custody order. Those provisions required the mother to "refrain from engaging in 'harassing' conduct" and "consult with [father] concerning . . . the children's educational and psychological counseling."
The trial court in 100
Nelson determined that the mother had violated the "harassment" requirement when she "made two complaints to the State child abuse hotline regarding [father] that were ultimately determined to be unfounded," and that she had 101 also violated the "consult with father" term of the custody order. On appeal, however, the appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in making these determinations, and reversed the contempt citations against her. Thus, trial court decisions regarding both the violation of custody orders and the appropriate sanctions for contempt are reviewable on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Additional grounds for appeal in many custody enforcement cases turn on the characterization of the contempt citation as either civil or criminal, a matter discussed in the next section. Ryder v. Ryder, No. 2001CA00190, 2002 WL 258218, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002 ) (citations omitted) (quoting the trial court transcript).
105. See infra text accompanying notes 130-50 (discussing coercive contempt orders in custody enforcement cases).
E. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt
A basic dichotomy in general contempt doctrine draws a line between "civil contempt" and "criminal contempt." The distinction has important consequences in the field of custody enforcement. The characterization of a contempt order as "civil" or "criminal" is based primarily on the nature of the sanctions imposed upon the contemnor, which reflect the purpose of the order.
102
The type of sanction typically associated with criminal contempt is the determinate jail sentence or fine payable to the court, intended to punish the contemnor for disrespect shown to the court in disobeying its prior order.
103
For example, an Ohio appellate court provided the following description of the criminal contempt order in a child visitation case:
[T]he trial court found [mother] guilty of willful contempt for violating the court's visitation order . . . and sentenced her to 30 days in jail and fined her $250. The purpose of the prison sentence and fine was punitive. . . . [T] he trial court expressed its disgust with the parents . . . and stated on the record that it was "done messing with this case" and that this was "the last straw."
104
Based on this record, the appellate court concluded that the contempt order was criminal, not civil, in nature.
By way of contrast, the sanctions for civil contempt are designed to be remedial rather than punitive, by coercing the contemnor's future compliance with the original court order or compensating the private party who suffered damages as a result of past violations. The most common coercive sanctions are the indeterminate jail sentence or a serial fine that is terminable upon the contemnor's compliance with the original court order.
For example, the 105 court may impose a daily fine upon the parent who unlawfully retains the physical custody of children, payable to the court each day until the children are returned to the other parent. The second category of remedial sanctions is compensatory in purpose, and often involves the payment of fines to 114. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15.5, at 15-17 to -18 (listing the right to a jury trial, right to counsel, presumption of innocence, standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to confront witnesses as procedural protections required in criminal contempt proceedings).
115. The amount of certainty required about the nature of the contempt proceeding, in child custody and visitation cases where due process violations are raised on appeal, seems to vary widely. Compare Korolko v. Korolko, 803 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that trial court's failure to mention the heightened burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing a fixed, six-month jail sentence did not constitute error, because "[n]othing in the record indicates that the chancellor was unaware of the proper burden of proof in this criminal contempt proceeding") and Lo v. Lo, 878 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[G] iven the ambiguity of the proceedings below, and failure of the trial court to afford the procedural safeguards [required] The double jeopardy rule is another constitutional protection for criminal defendants that has been extended to the criminal contempt context. For example, the father in State v. Hope successfully invoked the double 116 jeopardy rule to prevent his prosecution for the crime of kidnapping based on the abduction of his child for a period of five months. According to the court, a prior adjudication of the father's criminal contempt in the family court, based on the same wrongful conduct, barred the subsequent prosecution in criminal court.
117
The civil/criminal distinction in the law of contempt has ramifications in other substantive law contexts, for the parent who has been cited for the violation of a custody order. For example, a provision of the Bankruptcy Act automatically stays certain civil litigation matters in state court, pending the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings.
This [mother] and had to be initiated by the district attorney or the court on its own motion"). All of the other cases discussed in this Section involve an assumption that the complaining parent had standing to initiate an action for either civil contempt or criminal contempt. But see DOBBYN, supra note 108, at 218 (" [T] he in an earlier visitation enforcement proceeding against the father who subsequently filed for bankruptcy, because the contempt was criminal in nature.
Although the characterization of a contempt proceeding and contempt order as civil or criminal has important ramifications for the contemnor during the contempt hearing and thereafter, ambiguity exists in many cases as to this important matter. Often, the underlying contempt statutes, the parties' 120 pleadings, and the courts' orders all fail to clearly characterize contempt proceedings as criminal or civil in nature. The issue, then, is raised only after the fact, when some differing consequence between the two is at stake. According to one scholar in the field of injunctions, "[n]inety percent of the malfunctions in the system of contempt result from confusion . . . between these two types of contempt." The confusion is apparent in many custody 121 enforcement cases.
One factor contributing to the blurred line between civil and criminal contempt involves the absence of formal indicators in most criminal contempt cases that the proceeding is "criminal" in nature. The "criminal contempt" discussed here is not a crime prosecutable by the state in criminal court. 122 Rather, just like the civil contempt proceeding, a criminal contempt case is usually initiated by a private party in the civil court where the initial injunctive order was issued. In the field of custody enforcement, the complaining parent returns to the custody court to allege the contempt, whether criminal or civil, of the other parent who failed to comply with an initial custody order. W.2d 155, 157 (Ark. 1963 ) (rejecting father's claim that the trial court had improperly failed to apply the reasonable doubt standard required in criminal contempt cases). See generally Livingston, supra note 58, at 376 ("The [Supreme] Court emphatically rejected any attempt to classify contempts based on their underlying purpose, noting that any given contempt serves both remedial and punitive purposes to some extent.") (citing Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) Another factor that contributes to ambiguity in characterizing contempt orders involves the expansive judicial goals in many contempt cases. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt becomes blurry when a contempt order is intended to serve both punitive (associated with criminal contempt) and remedial (associated with civil contempt) purposes. For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas highlighted the apparently overlapping purposes of the contempt order in a visitation enforcement case, stating:
No doubt the two purposes [served by civil and criminal contempt adjudications, respectively] often merge as we think they do in this case. It appears from the wording of the [trial] court's order that the [father] was punished because he disobeyed the court's mandate (that is, to preserve the dignity of the court) and also to insure cooperation of the petitioner in the future (that is, to enforce the rights of [the mother]).
124
A related source of ambiguity is the failure of trial judges to maintain the bright doctrinal line drawn between the sanctions available for criminal and civil contempt, respectively. Since the characterization of a contempt order depends primarily upon the sanctions imposed by the court, this type of 125 blurring is inherently confusing. For example, the ambiguous contempt order in the South Carolina case of Poston v. Poston provided that the mother, 126 who had violated prior orders that she have no contact with her children, "shall be sentenced to 120 days incarceration but may purge herself of contempt by strict compliance with [the no-contact orders]."
The mother 127 appealed on the ground that the contempt adjudication was criminal in nature, so that the trial court's failure to apply the heightened standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt constituted reversible error. definite period of the sentence suggested a criminal sanction imposed for a punitive purpose, but the purge provision indicated a coercive purpose to be achieved via civil contempt. The Poston court remanded the case to the trial court to "clarify its intent and issue an order setting forth a contempt sanction that is either clearly criminal or clearly civil." 129 Thus, the dual systems of civil and criminal contempt, and the similarities between the two types of judicial proceedings and orders, may lead to ambiguity about the nature of the contempt order in cases where the parties' pleadings and the courts' orders do not clarify this issue. This lack of clarity complicates the enforcement of custody and visitation orders in many cases.
F. Coercive Civil Contempt Remedies in Child Custody Cases
Based on the "civil" label used by the parties and the courts, the nature of the sanctions imposed, and the explicit goals emphasized in judicial opinions, the majority of contempt cases in the family law area appear to fall into the civil contempt category. Thus, "[a]lthough criminal contempt may be appropriate in some custody matters, it is not as common as a civil contempt proceeding." Furthermore, as between the two types of remedial sanctions 130 available for civil contempt, coercive sanctions seem to be employed more readily than compensatory sanctions in child custody enforcement cases. Thus, "[a]s a general rule contempt proceedings in child custody and visitation disputes are civil contempts and have a basically remedial focus. They are intended to bring about compliance with the court's prior custody and visitation directives for the benefit of the other party . . . ."
131
The classic coercive contempt order, based on a finding that the contemnor violated an earlier order of the court, imposes a serial fine or openended jail sentence, which continues until the contemnor satisfies certain conditions set out in the contempt order. These conditions typically require compliance with the terms of the initial court order, thus highlighting the
